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The goal of this thesis is to implement a continuous integration system, which allows pe-
riodic and on-demand testing of provided Secure Socket Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer
Security (TLS) libraries on supported systems, and to show the functionality and potential
of such system by extending the existing interoperability test suite. The main benefit of
this thesis is ensuring interoperability between the most popular SSL/TLS libraries during
their development, and to discover potential issues in the shortest possible time. Presented
results show found issues discovered by combining and using the implementation parts of
this thesis on real world scenarios.
Abstrakt
Cílem této práce je implementace systému pro testování Secure Socket Layer (SSL) /
Transport Layer Security (TLS) knihoven na podporovaných systémech a jeho využití
na rozšířené sadě testů pro verifikaci jejich interoperability. Tento systém umožňuje jak
průběžné testování, tak testování na vyžádání pro specifickou verzi knihovny. Hlavním
přínosem této práce je zajištění inteoperability nejznámějších SSL/TLS knihoven již ve fázi
vývoje a detekce chyb v co nejkratším čase. Výsledky této práce ukazují nalezené problémy
na skutečných případech využití těchto knihoven a jejich dopad na systém, kde jsou použity.
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SSL/TLS is the most widely used technology for securing today’s Internet communica-
tions. Every application, which transmits data over the Internet, should implement some
kind of encryption and many of these applications use SSL/TLS. But, as the correct way
of implementing such encryption can be very tricky, and a simple mistake may have severe
consequences, several general-purpose implementations – libraries – were created. These
libraries allow the application to use SSL/TLS without having to create their own imple-
mentation.
Even though these libraries follow certain standards, which should ensure their interop-
erability (ability to communicate with any library which implements SSL/TLS according
to the standards), they may contain little deviations or issues which can cause unexpected
behavior or even some more serious problems (like denial of service). To avoid, or to at least
detect, such issues, we can implement tests, which will test the interoperability between
the SSL/TLS libraries. This is one of the main goals of this thesis.
Executing these tests manually for different environments would be ineffective, tedious
and not error-prone. Thus, using an automation, which would test various combinations
of different library versions on different versions of operating systems is necessary. Such
automation – in this case we call it continuous integration – is the second main topic of
this thesis.
By combining all these parts together, we get a powerful system for continuous SS-
L/TLS library testing. Such system can be used for regression detection and ensuring, that
interoperability between two given libraries works in a specific environment with a specific
combination of settings.
1.1 Structure of the Document
All necessary components for such system are described in the following chapters, starting
with a brief description of SSL/TLS protocols, their features, and existing implementations
in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 describes the test suite extension and the testing process itself, the design
and implementation of the continuous integration system, and how the combination of these
two major parts ensures interoperability of SSL/TLS libraries.
During the testing phase several issues were found. Some of them are ”harmless“, otherscan have a serious impact on the application, which uses given library. Summary of these
issues is detailed in Chapter 4 following a thesis summary in Chapter 5.
3
Chapter 2
Secure Sockets Layer / Transport
Layer Security
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and its successor Transport Layer Security (TLS) are crypto-
graphic protocols designed to provide communications security over a computer network.
As the latest version of the SSL protocol (version 3.0 [3]) was deprecated in June 2015 [13]
it will not be discussed further in this thesis.
Although there are currently three TLS versions – TLS 1.0 [17], TLS 1.1 [18], and TLS
1.2 [19] – this thesis focuses only on the latest two as TLS 1.0 is basically SSL 3.0 with a
few differences. Also, there were few cryptographic problems found in TLS 1.0 and later
resolved in TLS 1.1 (e.g. BEAST [8]).
2.1 Overview
The primary goal of the TLS protocol is to provide privacy and data integrity between two
communicating applications. The structure of the protocol comprises two layers: the TLS
Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake Protocol.
The TLS Record Protocol lies at the lowest level, above some reliable transport protocol
(e.g., TCP 1). This protocol provides security which has following properties:
• The connection is private. Symmetric cryptography is used for data encryption (e.g.,
AES 2, Camellia, 3DES 3, etc.). The keys for the symmetric encryption are generated
uniquely for each connection and are based on a secret negotiated by another protocol
(such as the TLS Handshake Protocol). The TLS Record Protocol can also be used
without encryption.
• The connection is reliable. Message transport includes a message integrity check
using a keyed MAC 4. Secure hash functions (e.g., SHA-1 5, SHA-256, etc.) are used








The TLS Record Protocol is used for encapsulation of various higher-level protocols.
One such protocol is the TLS Handshake Protocol. This protocol allows client authentica-
tion and negotiation of necessary properties of the TLS connection, like encryption algo-
rithm or cryptographic keys, before the data transmission. The TLS Handshake Protocol
provides connection security which has following properties:
• The peer’s identity can be authenticated using asymmetric, or public key, cryptog-
raphy (e.g., RSA 6, ECDSA 7, etc.). This authentication is not mandatory, but it is
generally required for at least one of the peers.
• The negotiation of a shared secret is secure. Obtaining of the shared secret is infea-
sible for any eavesdropper or attacker, who can place himself in the middle of the
authenticated connection.
• The negotiation is reliable. The negotiation communication cannot be modified with-
out being detected by the parties to the communication. [19]
In addition to the properties above, a carefully configured TLS connection can provide
another important privacy-related property: forward secrecy. This property ensures, that
any future disclosure or leakage of encryption keys cannot be used to decrypt any TLS
communications recorded or eavesdropped in the past.
TLS supports various combinations of algorithms for key exchange, data encryption and
message integrity authentication, which is an important fact for this thesis and can cause
severe issues when these combinations are configured or implemented improperly. Along
with these combinations, TLS supports many extensions further extending its capabilities
and possibilities, which will be described further in this thesis.
2.2 TLS Protocols
As mentioned above, the TLS protocol consists of four protocols – the TLS Record Protocol,
the TLS Handshake Protocol, the TLS Changer Cipher Spec Protocol, the TLS Alert
Protocol, and the TLS Application Data Protocol. In this section we will overview and
discuss these protocols in more detail.
2.2.1 TLS Record Protocol
In section 2.1 we briefly described the main function of the TLS Record Protocol, which
is encapsulation of protocol data from higher layers. This includes fragmentation, optional
compression, MAC application, encryption, and transmission of the data. On the receiving
side the data is decrypted, verified, decompressed, reassembled, and then delivered to the
higher layers.
Through the data processing, following TLS data structures are used – TLSPlaintext,
TLSCompressed and TLSCiphertext. At the end a TLS record is formed by appending an
TLS record header to the TLSCiphertext structure.
6Rivest-Shamir-Adleman cryptosystem
7Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
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2.2.2 TLS Handshake Protocol
The TLS Handshake Protocol is the core protocol of TLS which operates on top of the TLS
Record Protocol. Its goal is the authentication of communicating peers and negotiation of
security parameters necessary for establishment or resumption of secure sessions.
The session establishment consists of following steps:
• Protocol version negotiation
• Cipher suite negotiation
• Server authentication and (optional) client authentication using digital certificates
• Exchange of session key information
The actual session establishment using the TLS Handshake Protocol proceeds as follows
(see Figure 2.1):
1. The client sends a ClientHello message to the server, that includes the TLS version,
a list of cipher suites supported by the client (in the client’s order of preference), and
the client’s random value, which is used in subsequent computations.
2. The server responds with a ServerHello message, including the protocol version, the
cipher suite chosen by the server, the session ID, and the server’s random value.
3. If the server is to be authenticated, it sends its certificate in a Certificate message.
4. A ServerKeyExchange message may be sent if the client needs some additional infor-
mation for the key exchange.
5. If the client authentication is required, the server sends a CertificateRequest.
6. Finally, the server sends a ServerHelloDone message, to indicate that the hello-
message phase of the handshake is complete.
7. If the server has sent the CertificateRequest message, the client must send the
Certificate message containing its certificate.
8. The client sends a ClientKeyExchange message. Its content depends on the chosen
key exchange algorithm.
9. If the client has sent its certificate to the server, it must also send a digitally-signed
CertificateVerify message, which explicitly verifies possession of the private key
belonging to the client’s certificate.
10. The client sends a ChangeCipherSpec message to the server, using the TLS Change
Cipher Spec Protocol (see section 2.2.3) and copies its pending write state into the
current write state, which makes the negotiated settings active.
11. The client sends a Finished message to the server under the new write state (with
the new algorithms, keys, and secrets).
12. In response, the server sends its own ChangeCipherSpec message, copies its pending


















Figure 2.1: Full TLS handshake
Note: * marks messages which are sent only under specific conditions.
At this point, the TLS handshake is complete, and the peers may begin to exchange
application layer data.
When the client and the server decide to resume a previous session or duplicate an
existing one, the handshake can be simplified considerably (see Figure 2.2). The client
sends a ClientHello message including the ID of the session to be resumed. The server
then checks its session cache for a match. If a match is found, and the server is willing to re-
establish the connection under the specified session state, it sends a ServerHello message
with the same Session ID value. The client and the server can then directly move to the
ChangeCipherSpec message followed by the Finished message. If a Session ID match is
not found in the session cache, the server generates a new session ID and the peers perform










Figure 2.2: Simplified TLS handshake
Let’s have a closer look at the various messages that are exchanged during the TLS
handshake:
HelloRequest
This message may be sent by the server at any time and tells the client to begin a new session
negotiation. Client should respond to this message with a ClientHello. This message is
not often used, but it can be useful in some cases, e.g. forcing a session renegotiation for a
TLS sessions which are active for a longer period of time.
ClientHello
The ClientHello message is usually the first message in the TLS handshake, sent by the
client, which initiates the session negotiation. The message itself contains the latest TLS
version supported by the client, the client’s random value, a session ID (which can be empty,
if the client wishes to negotiate a new session), a list of supported cipher suites, a list of
compression methods, and optional extensions.
ServerHello
The ServerHello is the server’s response to the client’s ClientHello message. The struc-
ture of this message is quite similar to the ClientHello – instead of the lists of cipher suites
and compression methods, the server specifies a single cipher suite and a single compression
method. These values are chosen from the client’s ClientHello message and will be used
for the session. The complete message contains the TLS version chosen by the server, the
server’s random value, the length of the session ID and the session ID, the cipher suite, the
compression method, and the optional extensions.
Certificate
If the agreed-upon key exchange method uses certificates for authentication, the server
sends a Certificate message containing a certificate chain. This certificate chain can be
then used by the client, to verify the server’s identity. The same message is used when
a client authentication is required (as a response to a CertificateRequest message, see
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below). All exchanged certificates are of X.509 v3 type [5], if not stated otherwise during
the negotiation.
ServerKeyExchange
In some cases, the Certificate message does not contain enough data to allow the client
to exchange a pre-master secret. In this situation, the server sends a ServerKeyExchange
message with necessary cryptographic information, which allows such exchange and allows
the client to complete the key exchange.
When RSA (or Diffie-Hellman with fixed parameters) is used, the client can retrieve the
public key (or the server’s Diffie-Hellman parameters) from the server certificate. In these
cases the Certificate message is enough to complete a key exchange. But, for example,
in case of ephemeral Diffie-Hellman, the client needs some additional information — Diffie-
Hellman parameters — which must be delivered in a ServerKeyExchange message.
CertificateRequest
When the server wants to authenticate the client, it sends a CertificateRequest message
to the client. This message tells the client which certificates are accepted by the server,
and also asks the client to send its certificate to the server. Only a non-anonymous server
can send a CertificateRequest – that means a server, which authenticates itself using
the Certificate message.
ServerHelloDone
This message is sent by the server and indicates the end of the section of messages initiated
by the ServerHello message. After sending this message, the server will wait for a client
response.
ClientKeyExchange
The ClientKeyExchange message is sent by the client and it provides the server with the
client-side keying material, which is used to generate the pre-master secret.
CertificateVerify
If the client provided a certificate that has a signing capability, it must prove that it holds
the corresponding private key for that certificate. In this case, the client sends a digitally
signed CertificateVerify message to the server. This allows the server to verify the client
certificate using the client’s public key and authenticate the client.
Finished
The Finished message is always sent immediately after a ChangeCipherSpec message
(Section 2.2.3) to verify that the key exchange and authentication processes were successful.
As the message follows the ChangeCipherSpec message, it is the first message protected by
the newly negotiated algorithms and keys.
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2.2.3 TLS Change Cipher Spec Protocol
The TLS Change Cipher Spec Protocol is used to signal transitions in ciphering strategies.
The protocol itself consists of a single compressed and encrypted message – ChangeCipherSpec.
The encryption and compression methods correspond to the current (not the pending) ci-
pher spec.
After receiving this message, the receiver instructs its record layer to immediately copy
the read pending state into the read current state. Similarly, immediately after sending
this message, the sender instructs its record layer to copy the write pending state into the
write current state. All subsequent messages sent by the sender are then protected under
the newly negotiated cipher spec.
2.2.4 TLS Alert Protocol
To exchange alert messages between peers, like warnings and errors, the TLS Alert Protocol
is used. Each alert message has its severity (warning, fatal) and a description of the
alert. All messages with an alert level of fatal result in the immediate termination of the
connection.
The alert’s description field contains an identificator of the alert. These descriptions
can be split into two categories – closure alerts and error alerts. The former one contains
only one alert – close_notify. This message can be send by either party and notifies the
recipient that the sender will not send any more messages. Any data received after this
message must be ignored. The knowledge of the fact, that the connection is ending, is
crucial to avoid truncation attacks. The second category contains a number of error alerts
used for various purposed during the TLS session. All TLS alert messages are summarized
in Table B.1.
2.2.5 TLS Application Data Protocol
The TLS Application Data Protocol takes the arbitrary data from the application layer
and feeds it into the TLS Record Protocol for fragmentation, compression and encryption.
The resulting TLS records are then sent to the recipient.
2.3 Cipher Spec and Cipher Suite
In previous sections, terms cipher spec and cipher suite were mentioned. Let’s have a closer
look at their meanings.
A cipher spec refers to a pair of algorithms that are used to cryptographically protect
data. Such pair consists of a message authentication algorithm (MAC ) and a data en-
cryption algorithm. If we add a key exchange algorithm to a cipher spec, we get a cipher
suite.
For example, TLS_DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1 refers to a TLS cipher suite
which uses ephemeral Diffie-Hellman with RSA for a key exchange, 256-bit AES in CBC 8




As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, the ClientHello and ServerHello messages contain an
optional field for extensions. These extensions can be used to add functionality to TLS.
When a client wants to use an extension it sends its name in the ClientHello mes-
sage. If the extension is supported by the server, it will be included in the responding
ServerHello message. However, if the ServerHello message contains an extension, which
was not sent by the client, the connection must be aborted with an unsupported_extension
fatal alert (B.1). [15] [16]
Describing all currently implemented extensions [6] is way beyond scope of this thesis.
Thus, in the following paragraphs we will discuss only those extensions, which are currently
tested by the implementation part of this thesis. Nevertheless, support for other extensions
is highly probable in the near future.
2.4.1 Session Tickets
If a client wanted to resume an existing session, it would have to send a session ID in its
ClientHello message (field session_id) and the server would have to check its cache for
a match (see Section 2.2.2). This may cause problems on systems with a large amount of
requests from different users or on systems with little memory. For such cases there is a
SessionTicket TLS extension which uses client-side caching. [10]
In the initial handshake, where the client does not possess a ticket for an existing
session, it includes an empty SessionTicket TLS extension in its ClientHello message.
The server responds with an empty SessionTicket extension to indicate that it will send
a new session ticket using the NewSessionTicket message. This ticket contains the current
session state (such as cipher suite and master secret) and is cryptographically protected by
a key, which is known only to the server.
When the client wishes to resume the session, it includes the cached ticket in the
SessionTicket extension of its ClientHello message. The server then decrypts and veri-
fies the contents of the ticket and resumes the session according to the decrypted parameters.
If the server cannot, or does not want to use the state from the ticket, it can initiate a full
handshake with the client.
2.4.2 Signature Algorithms
TLS 1.2 defines ([19], section 7.4.1.4.1) an extension supported_signature_algorithms,
which allows the client to tell the server which hash and signature algorithm combina-
tions it supports. Even though internally the supported algorithms are split into two lists
(none, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 for hash algorithms and
anonymous, RSA, DSA and ECDSA for signature algorithms), the algorithms sent in the
extension are always listed in pairs, as not all combinations may be accepted by an imple-
mentation.
The peers exchange this information through the ClientHello and ServerHello mes-
sages including the supported_signature_algorithms extension. The client sends a list
of supported algorithms and the server responds with its choice, that is going to be used
for any subsequent signature generation and verification.
11
2.5 Libraries
To prevent each project implementing the SSL/TLS on its own and introducing (in many
situations) dangerous issues, several libraries were created and can be used by any project,
which needs a SSL/TLS support. The most popular ones are OpenSSL 9, NSS 10 and
GnuTLS 11. Although, there are other SSL/TLS libraries (e.g. LibreSSL 12 or BoringSSL 13),
this thesis aims only on these three. However, a future expansion to support other libraries
is not impossible.
Even though these libraries are separate projects, an user of such library must be able
to communicate with every client, which supports the particular protocol and cipher suite,
no matter which implementation they use. Testing of this functionality — interoperability
— is the main goal of this thesis.
For the testing itself we need at least two applications - a client and a server. One option
would be writing these applications from scratch, using the public API 14 of each library,
which is not error prone and would require a maintenance of such applications. Thankfully,
each of the tested libraries provides a set of utilities, among which we can find a simple
client and server applications with dozens of settings and options. These utilities are then
used in various scenarios to ensure, that given valid combination of settings works for both
client and server using different libraries.
2.5.1 OpenSSL
OpenSSL is an open source library maintained by The OpenSSL Project, which provides
a toolkit for SSL and TLS protocols, along with other general-purpose cryptographic func-
tions.
This library provides a single powerful utility called openssl. This utility has dozens of
sub-commands with various SSL/TLS related functionality, where the most important ones
are:
ciphers information about supported cipher suites
dsa, rsa, ec DSA/RSA/EC key management
s_client a simple SSL/TLS client
s_server a simple SSL/TLS server
x509 X.509 certificate data management
Thanks to its functionality-rich interface, OpenSSL is used for certificate generation and









Network Security Services (NSS) is a set of open source libraries providing support for
SSL and TLS protocols, S/MIME 15 and other optional features, like server-side TLS/SSL
acceleration or client-side hardware smart cards support.
Compared to OpenSSL, which has a single utility for everything, NSS does the exact
opposite – each feature or tool has its own utility. For our testing purposes, we will need
the following ones:
certutil certificate and key management for NSS databases
listsuites information about supported cipher suites
selfserv a simple SSL/TLS server
strsclnt a simple SSL/TLS client for performance testing
tstclnt a simple SSL/TLS client
This library differs from the other two in the way how it handles server and client
certificates. These certificates cannot be passed directly as arguments to the utility, but
must be imported to a NSS database which is then passed as an argument to the utility.
2.5.3 GnuTLS
GnuTLS is a secure communications library which implements SSL, TLS and DTLS 16
protocols.
Like the the libraries above, GnuTLS includes several utilities for library testing -
GnuTLS client gnutls-cli and GnuTLS server gnutls-serv. Both utilities support a pa-
rameter -l, which lists all necessary information about supported cipher suites.
15Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions




Following sections describe in detail the most important part of this thesis – implementation
of the continuous integration system, test extension, and how these two parts work together
to ensure interoperability of SSL/TLS libraries.
As the majority of the tests for this thesis were not developed from scratch, Section 3.6
contains a comprehensive review of things which were added throughout the implementation
of this thesis.
Detailed analysis of the test suite and its execution can be found in Appendix C, which
contains a test plan of the interoperability test suite, along with description of each test
case in Appendix D.
3.1 Tested Environments
For the purposes of this thesis, an environment consists of an operating system name (e.g.
CentOS 1, Fedora 2) and its version (e.g. 7, 25). Each of these environments must be tested
separately, as it contains a different set of library versions and policies, which affect the
SSL/TLS communication.
This thesis covers SSL/TLS libraries on CentOS and Fedora, as the tests used and
extended by this thesis were originally created for RHEL 3.
3.2 Test Format
Each test consists of two main files – runtest.sh and Makefile – and other optional auxiliary
files. Makefile contains metadata of the particular test, such as its name, author, version,
dependencies, information about relevancy, package(s) it tests, etc. It also contains several
make targets, so for example make run makes the runtest.sh executable and runs it. The CI
makes use of this file and extracts some necessary information from it – namely dependencies
and relevancy – to ensure correct execution of the test itself.
The second file – runtest.sh – is the core of the test. It is a Bash 4 script using the
BeakerLib 5 testing framework containing a sequence of commands and asserts which are
1https://www.centos.org/
2https://getfedora.org/




. / usr / share / beak e r l i b / beake r l i b . sh | | exit 1
PACKAGE=" opens s l "
r l J ou rna l S t a r t
r lPhaseStar tSetup
rlAssertRpm $PACKAGE
rlRun " TestDir=\$ (pwd) "
rlRun "TmpDir=\$ (mktemp␣−d) " 0 " Creat ing ␣tmp␣ d i r e c t o r y "
rlRun " pushd␣$TmpDir "
rlPhaseEnd
r lPhaseStar tTes t
rlRun " opens s l ␣ecparam␣−genkey␣−name␣prime256v1␣−out␣ ec . key "
r lAsser tGrep "BEGIN␣EC␣PRIVATE␣KEY" " ec . key "
rlPhaseEnd
r lPhaseStartCleanup
rlRun " popd "
rlRun "rm␣−r ␣$TmpDir " 0 "Removing␣tmp␣ d i r e c t o r y "
rlPhaseEnd
r lJourna lPr in tText
r lJournalEnd
Figure 3.1: Example runtest.sh file
executed and evaluated. Each command execution or an assert creates a record in a log,
which is processed, stored and printed at the end of each test run.
Let’s have an example runtest.sh script, which simply generates an elliptic curve key and
checks if it contains ”BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY“ (Figure 3.1). When executed, BeakerLibgenerates two logs – the first one is generated throughout the test execution and contains
outputs of all executed commands, whether the second one is generated at the end of the
test and contains a summary of the first log. An execution log can be seen in Figure 3.2.
3.2.1 Test relevancy
To control in which environments should be each test case executed, we have to implement
an algorithm, which would check if a given test case is relevant for a given environment
before the execution itself. The information about relevant environments is stated in the
Makefile of each test case and has a following format:
" Re l ea se s : −RHEL4 −RHELClient5 −RHELServer5 "
The test will be excluded from all environments which have a - symbol before their
name. Environments not included in the list are implicitly added when the final check
is done. The same syntax can be used for architectures as well, but as the current CI is
limited to the x86_64 architecture, it is not relevant for this thesis.
To apply this relevancy during the testing itself, a simple script was created, which parses
the Makefile and compares the parsed environments with the current one. If a match with
a non-excluded environment is found, the test is executed, otherwise it is simply skipped.
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: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
: : [ LOG ] : : Setup
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
openss l −1.1 .0 c−5. f c26 . x86_64
: : [ PASS ] : : Checking f o r the presence o f opens s l rpm
: : [ 2 2 : 32 : 45 ] : : Package v e r s i on s :
: : [ 2 2 : 32 : 45 ] : : openss l −1.1 .0 c−5. f c26 . x86_64
: : [ BEGIN ] : : Running ’ TestDir=$ (pwd) ’
: : [ PASS ] : : Command ’ TestDir=$ (pwd) ’ ( Expected 0 , got 0)
: : [ BEGIN ] : : Creat ing tmp d i r e c t o r y : : a c t ua l l y running
’TmpDir=$ (mktemp −d ) ’
: : [ PASS ] : : Creat ing tmp d i r e c t o r y ( Expected 0 , got 0)
: : [ BEGIN ] : : Running ’ pushd /tmp/tmp . qHTxIVtyY2 ’
/tmp/tmp . qHTxIVtyY2 /tmp
: : [ PASS ] : : Command ’ pushd /tmp/tmp . qHTxIVtyY2 ’
( Expected 0 , got 0)
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
: : [ LOG ] : : Test
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
: : [ BEGIN ] : : Generate an EC key : : a c t ua l l y running
’ opens s l ecparam −genkey −name prime256v1
−out ec . key ’
: : [ PASS ] : : Generate an EC key ( Expected 0 , got 0)
: : [ PASS ] : : F i l e ’ ec . key ’ should conta in ’BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY’
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
: : [ LOG ] : : Cleanup
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
: : [ BEGIN ] : : Running ’ popd ’
/tmp
: : [ PASS ] : : Command ’popd ’ ( Expected 0 , got 0)
: : [ BEGIN ] : : Removing tmp d i r e c t o r y : : a c t u a l l y running
’rm −r /tmp/tmp . qHTxIVtyY2 ’
: : [ PASS ] : : Removing tmp d i r e c t o r y ( Expected 0 , got 0)
Figure 3.2: Execution log of the runtest.sh from Figure 3.1
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As the CentOS and RHEL environments are basically the same, the relevancy script
is able to interchange between these two environments to avoid unnecessary duplicites in
the Makefile. Thus, a RHEL7 environment from the Makefile matches both CentOS 7 and
RHEL 7 environments.
3.3 Tested Features
Each library goes through several layers of testing:
• Basic interoperability – Simple communication without any special settings
• Session resumption – Verify if session resumption works (Section 2.2.2); this test
is done twice – with Session IDs and with SessionTicket extension (Section 2.4.1)
• Session renegotiation – Verify if session renegotiation works (Section 2.2.2)
• signature_algorithms* – Verify if signature_algorithms extension works (Section 2.4.2)
* This test is (so far) not implemented for all supported libraries, as some of them lack
the necessary support on CentOS.
All mentioned tests are performed multiple times – with and without client certificates,
with and without TLSv1.2 enabled, and for each supported cipher suite.
Apart from these tests, each tested combination has a Common Criteria test 6 which
tests the necessary subset of functionality which is required to work according to the library
specifications and standards.
3.4 Continuous Integration System
As manual testing is often tedious and not error prone, an automated system had to be
implemented to test a developed component both periodically and on-demand, when de-
veloper requests it. Such system should be capable of running all relevant tests for given
component without (almost) any manual intervention and reporting results back to the
person, who requested it. [4]
During the progress of this thesis, we tried several solutions before implementing and
accepting the final one.
3.4.1 GitHub & Webhooks
First of the proposed solutions was a simple Python script, which would make use of
GitHub’s webhooks [9]. This script would listen for requests from GitHub and would
perform required tasks.
This solution, even though it was very flexible, would require re-implementation of many
things already implemented in already existing solutions, which would consume unnecessary




During the search for more robust and complete solution, we come across Jenkins. Jenkins
is an open-source automation server, which can be used for automation of various tasks [11].
After several proof-of-concept solutions we knew, that Jenkins is something we can build
on.
Nevertheless, Jenkins itself lacks integration with GitHub. Thankfully, that could be
solved by using several open-source plugins. First of them is GitHub Plugin 7, which
provides a basic integration with GitHub and functionality for other GitHub plugins. This
functionality is used and improved by GitHub pull request builder plugin 8, which adds
support for polling from GitHub webhooks, trigger hooks for specific comments in pull
requests, customizable build status messages and others.
Combining all these things above together, we were able to create a working automation
system – CI – which reacted to changes in the test repository and reported build results
back to it. The major disadvantage was in running all build tasks on the same machine as
the Jenkins itself. So the another necessary task was implementing some kind of isolation
for the build tasks.
In our current infrastructure we use Beaker (Section 3.4.2) for machine provision, where
each tasks (or a set of tasks) has its own machine. This sounded like exactly what we needed,
but that would require obtaining machines for a machine pool and their maintenance, which
was far too excessive for a such small project.
Taking inspiration from another of our internal projects, we thought about using Open-
Stack (Section 3.4.2) for provision of virtual machines. OpenStack could run on the same
machine as Jenkins, so we would not need another hardware. Also, the provision can be
done from pre-installed images, so it would be much faster than in case of Beaker. Unfor-
tunately, after spending several hours by reading documentation and playing around with
OpenStack itself, we have concluded, that it would be too demanding to maintain.
Finally, we managed to isolate build tasks using Docker containers (Section 3.4.2).
But, after this step, where we managed to get rid of dependency on other machines, and
basically on a dependency on the underlying operating system itself, we were trying to
move everything to the cloud, so we would be free of the need of maintaining our own
infrastructure. And thankfully, after another trial and error, we managed to accomplish
that goal using Travis.
Beaker
Beaker is an open-source software for managing and automating labs of test computers. [14]
It allows administrators and users to maintain an automated inventory of all machines
present in the machine pool with system details, running tasks on machines with specific
environments and reporting (and storing) results back.
OpenStack
OpenStack is an open-source cloud operating system for managing pools of compute, stor-
age, and networking resources. [12] For easier administration and usage, almost everything




Stack itself consists of several components, which can be added or removed according to
the particular needs.
Docker
Docker is an open-source project which automates deployment of applications inside con-
tainers. [7] Container is a small, executable image, which contains all necessary software
to run a desired application without any other external dependencies, in an isolated envi-
ronment. This approach allows an user to run an application under a different operating
system – e.g. running an application in a CentOS 7 container even though the host oper-
ating system is Ubuntu. This feature is crucial in the CI implemented by this thesis.
3.5 The Final CI Implementation with Travis CI
As mentioned above, the chosen solution is Travis CI. Travis CI is a powerful, hosted,
distributed continuous integration service, used exclusively to build and test projects hosted
at GitHub. [20] It has two variants – commercial, for private projects and free, for open-
source projects. As all tests and scripts from this thesis are open-source, and we were
already using GitHub, we could use the free variant and throw away the need for our own
infrastructure.
After hooking a repository to Travis, it reacts to all commits, branches and pull requests,
for which a new build is created. Status of each build is reported back to GitHub in two
ways – for commits it is an icon in their summary (yellow dot for a running build, green
tick for a passed build and red cross for a failed build), and for pull requests it is located in
the information box of each pull request. Both ways contain a hyperlink to the particular
build with general overview and status with logs for each job (environment).
Nevertheless, even though Travis CI met our expectations, it was not exactly ”out-of-the-box“ solution, as several obstacles had to be overcome.
3.5.1 Operating System
First major issue was the OS used by Travis CI, which is Ubuntu, as our tests should run
on CentOS and Fedora. Thankfully, using and extending the already implemented solution
from the previous experience with Jenkins, we were able to workaround this issue using
Docker containers. Both CentOS 9 and Fedora 10 have official images for Docker, so we did
not have to bother with making and maintaining our own Docker images.
Travis CI itself supports Docker, so we can simply tell Travis to enable Docker for
our build, pull a correct docker image and then simply run whatever we want inside the
container.
3.5.2 Test Environments
Even though Travis does know the concept of environments, and has a built-in mechanism
for specifying a matrix of environment variables, where each set specifying an environment
has its own job, it still needs some handler, which would correctly set up the environment




For this purpose, a short Bash script was written 11. This script takes four arguments
– OS type (centos, fedora), OS version (7, 25, . . . ), component (openssl, gnutls, nss) and a
glob pattern for further test case specification (see Section 3.5.4).
Before executing the tests itself, several preparation steps need to be made to install
and configure all necessary dependencies. First of them is library certgen 12, written by
Hubert Kario, for generating certificates, which are later used in the testing process.
The second dependency, or to call it properly – the second workaround, is creating a
fake library for FIPS 13 configuration, as FIPS is not supported by Travis (yet). When
this library is loaded properly, it configures system into a FIPS mode. Current solution
just returns zero (success) without any changes to the underlying system, which allows us
running tests even in Travis without FIPS support.
The last thing, before the Docker execution itself, is checking each test for a
rlGetTestState command. This command must be present as the last thing in each test,
as all BeakerLib tests return zero even if they contain failed phases. Ensuring, that each test
has this command at its end, gives us relevant results from each test, as rlGetTestState
returns a number of failed phases as the script’s exit code (or 255 if the number of failed
phases is bigger than 255). [2]
After the preparations, a Docker container is executed with given environment settings
and the scripts/test-runner.sh script as the entry point. This script will be described
in detail in the following section.
3.5.3 Test Execution
As the test suite contains several tests, where each one of them lies in its own script file, it
does not have any entry point, which could be passed to Docker to run all tests. For this
case, a script 14 had to be created, which would coordinate test execution according to the
current environment.
This script has the same arguments as the test-setup.sh – OS type, OS version,
component and a test glob – which are used to determine a package manager (yum on
CentOS or dnf on Fedora), correct OS version (Docker images support a ”latest“ tag,which needs to be translated to the exact version), and whether to configure EPEL 15
repository, as BeakerLib is not in the base repositories on CentOS.
As these test were originally developed for RHEL (and still are), another workaround
had to be implemented to avoid complex branching in the tests themselves. BeakerLib has
a function rlIsRHEL [2], which allows certain phases to be run only on some version of
RHEL – e.g. condition if rlIsRHEL 6; then ... would execute a code inside of the if
statement only on RHEL 6. But this function does not work on CentOS. For CentOS, there
is a conveniently named function rlIsCentOS, which does the same thing. To avoid having
to use both functions for each if statement, the test-runner.sh creates a wrapper function
rlIsRHEL which overloads the original function. The overloaded function then simply calls
rlIsCentOS, so the tests can use the RHEL function only.
Next step is a full system upgrade, as the Docker images are usually not up to date,
followed by installation of basic dependencies necessary for the test execution.
11scripts/test-setup.sh
12https://github.com/redhat-qe-security/certgen




The core of the test runner scripts consist of a loop, which goes through all tests for
given component. If the test passes through all relevancy checks, it is executed, otherwise
it is skipped.
The first relevancy check is via the previously mentioned glob pattern, which uses ex-
tended globbing feature of Bash. This glob pattern is then simply matched with the test
case name – if it matches, the test continues to the next relevancy check, otherwise it is
skipped.
The second check is a comparison of OS version and OS type with metadata from the
test’s Makefile (see Section 3.2.1). For this purpose, we have a script scripts/relevancy.awk
written, as the name suggests, in GNU AWK 16. This script, apart from the comparison
itself, performs necessary substitutions between RHEL and CentOS to give correct results.
If a test passes through all relevancy checks, its Makefile is parsed once again for de-
pendencies (section Requires). These dependencies are installed and the test is executed.
The test runner keeps statistics of executed, skipped and failed tests, which are logged
along the test results and can be viewed in the Travis web UI.
3.5.4 Performance and Limits
During the CI development, we found out about several limiting factors in Travis, which
had to be solved. Some of them are related only to the free version of Travis CI (for
open-source projects), and some of them affecting all Travis versions.
First one is a time limit per job, which is 50 minutes. At the beginning of this thesis
this was not an issue, as there was a quite big reserve in this matter. Nevertheless, as more
and more test combinations were added, this limit was hit several times.
Originally, each OS type and version had its own job, so there was one job for CentOS 6,
one for CentOS 7, and one for the latest Fedora. The first step of solving the aforementioned
issue was creating a separate job for each OS type, version and component combination.
This resulted in nine jobs (GnuTLS, NSS, and OpenSSL times supported operating systems)
which were enough, at least for a while.
As another batch of changes was added, the limit was hit again on Fedora along with
another, previously unknown limit – the size of the result log – which is 4 MiB. After
several proposed solutions we decided to add another variable to the environment definition
– test glob – which allows splitting each component test suite internally into smaller pieces,
depending on their name. This solution proved to be quite effective and should last for a
while (until we reach another milestone, where one test runs for more than 50 minutes).
3.5.5 On-demand Library Compilation
To be able to call this system a ”continuous integration system“, there had to be a way howto test a development version of a SSL/TLS library. This appeared to be a complicated
issue, as Travis itself does not support monitoring of external repositories, thus it is not
able to tell whether a new change was committed to such repository. 17
As stated in previous sections, any dependency on an external infrastructure is unwanted
(e.g. an external watchdog). Thus, after several proposals, a semi-automated solution was




with target SSL/TLS library, a branch, which contains desired library version, and a library
identifier.
If such configuration file exists, the test-runner.sh script 3.5.3 tries to read it and if
it is a valid configuration, it passes all parsed information to the scripts/lib-compile.sh
script. This script contains recipes for all supported libraries, as each library has a custom
way of compilation and installation. If the compilation fails, the job is immediately aborted
and a build log is printed to the resulting log to be analysed. Otherwise, the test runner
continues as usual with execution of all relevant tests for given environment.
This solution has a few disadvantages – the library is compiled in each job, which is
unnecessary, and it requires a separate branch to be created manually by a developer, with
the custom configuration file. The first issue is particularly hard to solve, as the jobs does
not have any shared space, and usually run in parallel. The second issue it not easy to
solve as well, without incorporating some kind of external system or watchdog. As this
implementation is currently being discussed and tested by developers, it is possible it will
be improved or replaced completely in the future.
3.6 Test Extension Details
As this thesis started with an already existing interoperability test suite (and its purpose
was to extend it), following paragraphs should make clear what was already implemented




• Use certgen library for generating certificates
• Test 20 cipher suites instead of only the default one
• Test renegotiation scenarios with client certificates
Overall stats: 457 additions, 32 deletions
gnutls/renegotiation-with-OpenSSL
New features:
• Use certgen library for generating certificates
• Test 20 cipher suites instead of only the default one
• Test renegotiation scenarios with client certificates




• Create certificate PKI
• Test 20 cipher suites instead of only the default one
• Test resumption scenarios with client certificates and with SessionTicket extension
Overall stats: 469 additions, 35 deletions
gnutls/resumption-with-OpenSSL
New features:
• Use certgen library for generating certificates
• Test 20 cipher suites instead of only the default one
• Test resumption scenarios with client certificates and with SessionTicket extension
Overall stats: 425 additions, 29 deletions
gnutls/signature_algorithms-with-OpenSSL
New test; features:
• Generate PKI using certgen library
• Test signature_algorithms extension (see [19], Section 7.4.1.4.1)
• Test if negotiation of a signatue algorithm for a client certificate verification works
Overall stats: 411 additions, 0 deletions
gnutls/TLSv1-2-with-NSS
New features:
• Explicitly enable RC4 and DHE-DSS
• Temporarily ignore crypto-policies on Fedora
Overall stats: 13 additions, 6 deletions
gnutls/TLSv1-2-with-OpenSSL
New features:
• Explicitly enable RC4 and DHE-DSS





• Explicitly enable RC4 and DHE-DSS
Overall stats: 10 additions, 3 deletions
nss/Interoperability-with-OpenSSL
Future of this test is currently being discussed, as in its actual state it does not work on any
supported system, but it contains important sections which are not covered by other tests
– namely generation and usage of certificates generated by NSS library. Several proposals
were made, but the implementation requires further investigation.
nss/renego-and-resumption-NSS-with-OpenSSL
New features:
• OpenSSL-NSS - basic interoperability
• OpenSSL-NSS - basic interoperability with client certificates
• NSS-OpenSSL - fixed basic interoperability
• NSS-OpenSSL - fixed basic interoperability with client certificates
• NSS-OpenSSL - session renegotiation
• NSS-OpenSSL - session renegotiation with client certificates
• NSS-OpenSSL - session resumption
• NSS-OpenSSL - session resumption with client certificates
• Add missing expect scripts




• Explicitly enable RC4 and DHE-DSS
Overall stats: 9 additions, 2 deletions
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3.7 Outstanding Issues
Even though dozens of issues were found and resolved throughout the the implementation
process, several of them still persist for various reasons – either the solution lies in parts
which couldn’t be influenced by this thesis, or there was not enough time or data to come
up with a proper fix.
First of them is the aforementioned FIPS support, which is currently non-existent in
Travis. Thankfully, it is not a crucial part of the testing process, so it won’t affect results
of this thesis.
Another issue lies in expect scripts [1]. Thanks to expect, one can write scripts for
interactive applications, which can be then used in automation. These scripts are used
in many places throughout the interoperability test suite for interaction with SSL/TLS
utilities. Unfortunately, as interactive applications were not meant to be scripted, these
scripts can be unreliable under specific conditions – e.g. delay in the expected input – which
may cause unexpected errors and fails during the testing process. Some of these issues were
already resolved, but some of them are still present, as they happen sporadically and are




Throughout the test extension process, several bugs and issues were found in the tested
libraries, as well as in the auxiliary utilities. These issues have various levels of security
impact and will be described in detail in this chapter.





<version>: <link to component’s issue tracker>
Issue ID abbreviations:
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 1
BZ Red Hat bug-tracking system 2
MBZ Mozilla bug-tracking system 3
4.1 NSS
CVE-2016-9574, BZ#1397482, BZ#1397410
[Urgent, RHEL/CentOS 6, RHEL/CentOS 7]
Segfault in selfserv during session handshake when using SessionTicket exten-
sion and ECDHE-ECDSA cipher suites
selfserv utility crashes during handshake when using SessionTicket extension for session









[Urgent, RHEL/CentOS 7, upstream]
Support ticket based session resumption using only ECDSA certificate





[Unspecified, RHEL/CentOS 7, upstream]
Sending of CERTIFICATE REQUEST messages does not correspond to manual
When -r or -rr parameter is used with selfserv utility, to request (and require) client cer-
tificate on initial handshake, the CERTIFICATE REQUEST message is sent on both hand-
shakes, whereas when -rrr or -rrrr parameter is used, the CERTIFICATE REQUEST
message is not sent at all. This does not correspond to the manual of the selfserv utility,
which states following:
−r f l a g i s i n t e r e p r e t e d as f o l l ow s :
1 −r means request , not r equ i r e , c e r t on i n i t i a l handshake .
2 −r ’ s mean reque s t and requ i r e , c e r t on i n i t i a l handshake .
3 −r ’ s mean request , not r equ i r e , c e r t on second handshake .




[Low, RHEL/CentOS 6, RHEL/CentOS 7, upstream]
strsclnt gets stuck during session resumption when using client certificates
strsclnt utility gets stuck during session resumption (for both SessionTicket and Ses-






[Low, RHEL/CentOS 6, RHEL/CentOS 7]
NSS session resumption using session ID does not work for DHE-DSS cipher-
suites
When NSS acts as a server, session resumption using SessionID does not work for cipher
suites using DHE-DSS algorithm. Even though this behavior is expected for the ticket






Broken Crypto Policy handling of RC4 cipher suites
On F25 RC4 ciphers in NSS should be disabled by Crypto Policy, but in the current version
it works only partially - when NSS acts as a client, the handshake fails, but when it acts





Duplicate PK signature algorithms in gnutls-cli output
Output of gnutls-cli -l command contains duplicate public key signature algorithms –




Session renegotiation fails with client certificates
GnuTLS sends a client certificate in renegotiation, even if it was not requested by the server,






rlWaitForSocket –close now waits for incorrect socket
A patch in the latest testing version of BeakerLib causes that rlWaitForSocket –close





This thesis stared with an existing interoperability test suite, which was significantly ex-
tended under a thorough supervision, which ensured that all new parts test the exact
functionality which they are supposed to test. Also, a continuous integration system was
implemented from scratch, to find issues as soon as possible, mainly during the SSL/TLS
library development. The usefulness and importance of such system was demonstrated
by integrating the extended test suite into the system, which resulted in several issues of
various severity being found and reported to the responsible parties.
As the results of this thesis are meant to be public, to help as many people as possible,
the current version of all tests and auxiliary scripts can be found on GitHub 1. Also, the
continuous integration system is located on Travis CI website 2, which contains results from
all past, current, and future test runs.
Even though this thesis brought a significant improvement into the interoperability
testing of TLS/SSL libraries, there remains a future work in several areas. One of them
is the test suite itself, as it is still far from being complete, due to many TLS extensions,
which are still not covered – either due to lack of time, or lack of support in the libraries
themselves. After several discussions with developers and testers of mentioned libraries, I
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The attached CD contains the source code of all components implemented by this thesis –
the SSL/TLS test suite, the auxiliary scripts of the continuous integration system, and the




Table B.1: TLS Alerts
Alert ID Description
close_notify 0 The sender notifies the recipient that it will not
send any more messages on this connection.
unexpected_message 10 An inappropriate message was received. This
alert is always fatal.
bad_record_mac 20 The sender received a record with an incorrect
MAC. This alert is always fatal.
decryption_failed_RESERVED 21 Used in some earlier versions of TLS, must not
be sent by compliant implementations.
record_overflow 22 A TLSCiphertext record was received that had
a length more than 214 + 2048 bytes or a record
decrypted to a TLSCompressed record with more
than 214 +1024 bytes. This alert is always fatal.
decompression_failure 30 The decompression function received improper
input. This alert is always fatal.
handshake_failure 40 The sender was unable to negotiate an accept-
able set of security parameters given the options
available. This alert is always fatal.
no_certificate_RESERVED 41 This alert was used in SSLv3 but it no longer
used in any TLS version.
bad_certificate 42 The sender notifies the recipient that the pro-
vided certificate is corrupt.
unsupported_certificate 43 The sender notifies the recipient that the pro-
vided certificate is of an unsupported type.
certificate_revoked 44 The sender notifies the recipient that the pro-
vided certificate was revoked by the issuing au-
thority.
certificate_expired 45 The sender notifies the recipient that the pro-
vided certificate has expired or is no longer valid.
certificate_unknown 46 The sender notifies the recipient that some un-
specified issue occured during the certificate pro-
cessing, rendering it unacceptable.
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Table B.1: TLS Alerts
Alert ID Description
illegal_parameter 47 A field in the handshake was out of range or in-
consistent with other fields. This alert is always
fatal.
unknown_ca 48 The received certificate could not be validated,
because the CA certificate could not be located
or could not be matched with a known, trusted
CA. This alert is always fatal.
access_denied 49 A valid certificate was received, but when access
control was applied, the sender decided not to
proceed with negotiation. This alert is always
fatal.
decode_error 50 The received message could not be decoded be-
cause some field was out of the specified range or
length of the message was incorrect. This alert
is always fatal.
decrypt_error 51 A handshake cryptographic operation failed.
This alert is always fatal.
export_restriction_RESERVED 60 Used in some earlier versions of TLS, must not
be sent by compliant implementations.
protocol_version 70 The protocol version the client has attempted to
negotiate is recognized but not supported. This
alert is always fatal.
insufficient_security 71 The server requires more secure ciphers than
those supported by the client. This alert is al-
ways fatal.
internal_error 80 An internal error occured, unrelated to the peer
or corectness of the protocol. This alert is always
fatal.
user_canceled 90 This handshake is being canceled for some reason
unrelated to a protocol failure. This alert should
be followed by a close_notify.
no_renegotiation 100 The peer should respond with this alert when
renegotiation is not appropriate regarding the
current connection state. This alert is always
a warning.
unsupported_extension 110 Sent by the client when the received
ServerHello message contains an exten-
sion not sent by the client in its ClientHello




C.1 Test Plan Identifier
TLS/SSL Interoperability Test Plan v0.1
C.2 References
• IEEE 829-2008 Standard for Software Test Documentation 1
• Common Criteria access.redhat.com 2
C.3 Introduction
The main goal of this test plan is to ensure interoperability of supported SSL/TLS libraries
on CentOS/RHEL and Fedora systems. The testing itself involves verification of ability







C.4.2 Environments: Releases and Architectures
Due to limitations of the current CI all tests are run on x86_64 architeture only. Neverthe-
less, they should work on all architectures supported by the underlying operating system.
• CentOS 6 and 7 (latest releases)




C.5 Software Risk Issues
• Package rebases can cause unexpected behavior and/or regressions – thorough test
results analysis is necessary
C.6 Features to be Tested
All features are tested using TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 protocols with all supported cipher
suites by the involved parties.
• Basic interoperability
• Inteoperability with client certificates
• Session renegotiation
• Session renegotiation with client certificates
• Session resumption using Session ID
• Session resumption using Session ID with client certificates
• Session resumption using TLS SessionTicket Extension
• Session resumption using TLS SessionTicket Extension with client certificates
• SignatureAlgorithms TLS Extension
C.7 Features not to be Tested
• Sanity of the available options
• Regressions
• Security of the implementation
C.8 Approach
All testing is done by Bash scripts using Beakerlib 3 testing framework. This framework
manages log collection and results reporting and automatizes the entire testing process.
Each library has a set of utilites, which are used for the interoperability testing itself:
• OpenSSL – openssl utility (package openssl)
• NSS – utilities selfserv, tstclnt, strsclnt, etc. (package nss-tools)
• GnuTLS – utilities gnutls-cli and gnutls-serv (package gnutls-utils)
All libraries are tested in pairs in a client-server fashion, where each phase tests a specific
combination of parameters (specific cipher suite, protocol, extension, etc.).
Each failure is investigated and if it is a library issue, it is reported to the upstream
and/or to a respective downstream bug tracker.
3https://github.com/beakerlib/beakerlib
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C.9 Item Pass/Fail Criteria
A handshake is completed successfully in all cases with all requested settings set, i.e.:
• Expected cipher suite is used
• Expected protocol is used
• A specific extension requested in Client/Server Hello is used
• Session is correctly resumed when session resumption is requested
• Session renegotiation is successful
C.10 Test Cases
Table C.1: Test case matrix







gnutls/TLSv1-2-with-NSS x x x
gnutls/TLSv1-2-with-OpenSSL x x x
nss/CC-nss-with-gnutls x x
nss/CC-nss-with-openssl x x
nss/Interoperability-with-OpenSSL x x x
nss/renego-and-resumption-NSS-with-OpenSSL x x x
openssl/CC-openssl-with-gnutls x x
Brief description of all test cases can be found in Appendix D.
C.11 Suspension Criteria and Resumption Requirements
Testing will be suspended if any of the following criteria are met:
• Underlying operating system is not installable
• Existing issues may prevent execution of the test suite
Testing will be resumed when all mentioned issues are resolved.
C.12 Test Deliverables
The test results generated by Beakerlib will be stored in the CI and all failures will be
analysed. The analysis itself can yield following results:
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• Failure caused by the tested component – a new bug will be reported
• Failure caused by the test – the test case will be fixed
• Failure caused by an error in the infrastructure/environment – the test case will be
run again
C.13 Remaining Test Tasks




Implementation of tests for these extension is currently blocked on the limited support
of these extensions by the utilities of SSL/TLS libraries.
Testing of some recent algorithms for TLS should be considered as well (e.g. ChaCha20-




Testing will be performed on x86_64 architecture as it is the only architecture supported
by the current CI. Particular hardware configuration is not important for the testing itself.
C.14.2 Software
No special configuration of the operating system is needed. All packages necessary for the
testing will be installed by the CI system.









Currently all tests are being executed when a new PR or commit is pushed to the test
repository, periodically every week on the latest versions of supported systems, and on-
demand on a user-specified library repository.
Long term plans include delivering all test cases to both downstream and upstream, so






Note: the term ”various cipher suites“ used in following sections describes cipher suitesusing different key exchange algorithms (RSA, DHE, ECDHE), authentication algorithms
(RSA, DSA, ECDSA), block cipher algorithms (3DES, AES) and message authentication
algorithms (SHA). Mentioned algorithms may also differ in modes (AES-GCM, AES-CBC,
. . . ) and sizes (AES-128, AES-256, SHA-1, SHA-256, . . . ).
D.1 GnuTLS
renegotiation-with-NSS
Test session renegotiation between GnuTLS and NSS libraries using various cipher
suites, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 protocols, and client certificates.
renegotiation-with-OpenSSL
Test session renegotiation between GnuTLS and OpenSSL libraries using various ci-
pher suites, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 protocols, and client certificates.
resumption-with-NSS
Test session resumption between GnuTLS and NSS libraries using various cipher
suites, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 protocols, and client certificates. The resumption itself
is tested using both Session IDs and SessionTicket extension.
resumption-with-OpenSSL
Test session resumption between GnuTLS and OpenSSL libraries using various cipher
suites, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 protocols, and client certificates. The resumption itself
is tested using both Session IDs and SessionTicket extension.
signature_algorithms-with-OpenSSL
Test signature_algorithms extension in communication between GnuTLS and OpenSSL
libraries with and without client certificates. This extension is present only in TLSv1.2
and higher. As this extension has to be explicitly enabled, it is currently tested only
in this combination of libraries, due to lack of support in testing utilities provided by
the libraries.
TLSv1-2-with-NSS








Test interoperability of cipher suites relevant for Common Criteria certification be-
tween NSS and GnuTLS libraries with and without client certificates.
CC-nss-with-openssl
Test interoperability of cipher suites relevant for Common Criteria certification be-
tween NSS and OpenSSL libraries with and without client certificates.
Interoperability-with-OpenSSL
Test interoperability between NSS and OpenSSL libraries using certificates generated
by NSS (all other tests use certificates generated by OpenSSL). This test is currently
under heavy refactoring as it was originally developed for RHEL 6.
renego-and-resumption-NSS-with-OpenSSL
Test session renegotiaton and session resumption between NSS and OpenSSL libraries.
Both methods are tested using various cipher suites, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 protocols,




Test interoperability of cipher suites relevant for Common Criteria certification be-
tween OpenSSL and GnuTLS libraries with and without client certificates.
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